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Abstract
We study Stackelberg Security Games where the
defender, in addition to allocating defensive re-
sources to protect targets from the attacker, can
strategically manipulate the attacker’s payoff un-
der budget constraints in weighted Lp-norm form
regarding the amount of change. For the case
of weighted L1-norm constraint, we present (i) a
mixed integer linear program-based algorithm with
approximation guarantee; (ii) a branch-and-bound
based algorithm with improved efficiency achieved
by effective pruning; (iii) a polynomial time ap-
proximation scheme for a special but practical class
of problems. In addition, we show that problems
under budget constraints in L0 and weighted L∞-
norm form can be solved in polynomial time.
1 Introduction
Research efforts in security games have led to success in
various domains, ranging from protecting critical infrastruc-
ture [Letchford and Conitzer, 2013; Wang et al., 2016] and
catching fare invaders in metro systems [Yin et al., 2012], to
combating poaching [Fang et al., 2016] and preventing cy-
ber intrusions [Durkota et al., 2015; Basilico et al., 2016].
In these games, a defender protects a set of targets from an
attacker by allocating defensive resources. One key element
that characterizes the strategies of the players is the payoff
structure. Existing work in this area typically treats the pay-
off structure of the players as given parameters, sometimes
with uncertainties known a priori given the nature of the do-
main. However, under various circumstances, the defender is
able to change the attacker’s payoff, thus rendering the ex-
isting models inadequate in expressiveness. For example, in
wildlife poaching, the law enforcement agency may charge
a variable fine if the poacher is caught at different locations,
e.g., in the core area vs. in the non-core area. In cyberse-
curity, the network administrator may change the actual or
appeared value of any network node for a potential attacker.
In these cases, the defender’s decision making is two-staged:
she chooses the payoff structure, as well as the strategy of al-
locating defensive resources. With a properly chosen payoff
structure, the defender may save the effort by achieving much
better utility with the same or even less amount of resources.
∗Z. R. Shi and Z. Tang contributed equally to this work.
As existing work in security games does not provide ade-
quate tools to deal with this problem (see Section 2 for more
details), we aim to fill this gap as follows. We study how
to design the attacker’s payoff structure in security games
given budget constraints in weighted Lp-norm (p = 0, 1,∞).
That is, the distance between the original payoff structure and
the modified payoff structure is bounded, using distance met-
rics such as Manhattan distance (i.e., L1-norm) with vary-
ing weights for reward and penalty of different targets. The
intuition behind this setting is that the defender can change
the payoffs to make a target that is preferable to the defender
more attractive to the attacker and disincentivize the attacker
from attacking targets that can lead to a significant loss to the
defender. More change incurs a higher cost to the defender
and the defender has a fixed budget for making the changes.
Our findings can be summarized as follows:
L1-norm case: When the budget constraint is in weighted
L1-norm form, i.e. additive cost, our contribution is threefold.
(i) We exploit several key properties of the optimal manipu-
lation and propose a mixed integer linear program (MILP)-
based algorithm with approximation guarantee. (ii) We pro-
pose a novel branch-and-bound approach with improved ef-
ficiency achieved by effective pruning for the general case.
(iii) Finally, we show that a polynomial time approximation
scheme (PTAS) exists for a special but practical case where
the budget is very limited and the manipulation cost is uni-
form across targets. The PTAS is built upon the key observa-
tion that there is an optimal solution where no more than two
targets’ payoffs are changed in this restricted case.
L0 and L∞-norm cases: We propose a O(n3) and a
O(n2 log n) algorithm for problems under budget constraints
in L0-norm form and weighted L∞-norm form1, respectively,
where n is the total number of targets. For L0-norm form
budget, i.e. limited number of targets to manipulate, our al-
gorithm converts the problem into O(n2) subproblems and
reduces each subproblem to a problem of finding a subset of
items with the maximum average weight. The latter can be
solved in O(n) time. For L∞-norm form budget, i.e. limited
range of manipulation on each target, we reduce the problem
to traditional Stackelberg Security Games with fixed payoff
structure, which again admits an efficient algorithm.
Numerical evaluation: We provide extensive experimen-
1The L0-norm is not actually a norm, but we use the term for
simplicity and its definition is given in Sec. 4.2. The definition of
weighted L∞-norm is given in Sec. 4.1.
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tal evaluation for the proposed algorithms. For problems with
L1-norm form budget constraint, we show that the branch-
and-bound approach with an additive approximation guaran-
tee can solve up to hundreds of targets in a few minutes. This
is faster than other baseline algorithms we compare to. Some-
what surprisingly, naively solving n non-convex subproblems
using interior point method achieves good performance in
practice despite that there is no theoretical guarantee of solu-
tion quality. We also evaluate the proposed O(n3) algorithm
for the L0-norm form case and show its superior performance
over two greedy algorithms and a MILP based algorithm.
2 Preliminaries and Related Work
The security game that we consider in this paper features a set
of n targets, T = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The defender has r units of
defensive resources, each can protect one target. The attacker
can choose to attack one target after observing the defender’s
strategy. If the defender covers target iwhen it is attacked, the
defender gets a reward Rdi ≥ 0 and the attacker gets a penalty
P ai ≤ 0. Otherwise, the defender gets a penalty P di ≤ 0
and the attacker gets a reward Rai ≥ 0. When the defender
commits to a mixed strategy c, that is, covering target i with
probability ci, the defender’s and attacker’s expected utilities
when target i is attacked are Udi = ciR
d
i + (1 − ci)P di and
Uai = ciP
a
i + (1− ci)Rai , respectively.
We adopt the commonly used solution concept of Strong
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) [Kiekintveld et al., 2009]. At
an SSE, the defender chooses an optimal strategy that leads to
the highest expected utility for her when the attacker chooses
a best response (assumed to be a pure strategy w.l.o.g), break-
ing ties in favor of the defender. Given a coverage c, the attack
set Γ ⊆ T contains all the targets which have a weakly higher
attacker’s expected utility than any other target, i.e.,
Γ = {j ∈ T : Uaj ≥ Uak ,∀k ∈ T} (1)
[Kiekintveld et al., 2009] show that there exists an SSE where
the defender only covers the targets in the attack set.
Given the game parameters, the optimal defender strategy
in such a game can be computed using multiple linear pro-
grams (LPs) [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006] or an efficient
O(n2) algorithm called ORIGAMI [Kiekintveld et al., 2009]
based on enumerating the possible attack sets. We leverage
insights from both works to devise our algorithms.
Although many algorithms have been developed for se-
curity games under various settings, in most of the existing
literature, the payoff structure is treated as fixed and can-
not be changed by the defender, either in the full informa-
tion case [Korzhyk et al., 2010; Paruchuri et al., 2008;
Laszka et al., 2017], or in the presence of payoff uncer-
tainties [Kiekintveld et al., 2013; Kiekintveld et al., 2011;
Yin and Tambe, 2012; Letchford et al., 2009; Blum et al.,
2014]. As mentioned earlier, in many real-world scenarios
the defender has control over the attacker’s payoffs. The ap-
proaches above ignore this aspect and thus leave room for
further optimization.
Indeed, despite its significance, jointly optimizing the pay-
off structure and the resource allocation is yet under-explored.
A notable exception, and a most directly related work to ours,
is the audit game model [Blocki et al., 2013; Blocki et al.,
2015]. The defender can choose target-specific “punishment
rates”, in order to maximize her expected utility offset by
the cost of setting the punishment rate. Compared with their
model, ours is more general in that we allow not only ma-
nipulation of attacker’s penalty, but also attacker’s reward.
This realistic extension makes their core techniques inappli-
cable. Also, we treat the manipulation cost as a constraint
instead of a regularization term in the objective function, for
in some real-world settings, payoffs can be manipulated only
once, yet the defender may face multiple attacks afterwards.
This makes it hard to determine the regularization coeffi-
cient. Another closely related work [Schlenker et al., 2018]
focuses on the use of honeypot [Kiekintveld et al., 2015;
Durkota et al., 2015; Píbil et al., 2012]. It studies the problem
of deceiving a cyber attacker by manipulating the attacker’s
(believed) payoff. However, it assumes the defender can only
change the payoff structure, ignoring the allocation of defen-
sive resources after the manipulation. [Horák et al., 2017]
study the manipulation of attacker’s belief in a repeated game.
They assume actively engaging attacker and defender, which
is not the case in our problem.
If we conceptually decouple the payoff manipulation from
resource allocation, the defender faces a two-stage decision.
She first chooses the structure of the game, and then plays
the game. Thus, our problem may be viewed as a mech-
anism design problem, albeit not in a conventional setting.
Most work in mechanism design considers private informa-
tion games [Fujishima et al., 1999; Myerson, 1989], while
in our work, and in most security game literature, the payoff
information is public. Some design the incentive mechanism
using a Stackelberg game [Kang and Wu, 2015], with applica-
tions to network routing [Sharma and Williamson, 2007], mo-
bile phone sensing [Yang et al., 2012], and ecology surveil-
lance [Xue et al., 2016]. However, these works solve the
Stackelberg game to design the mechanism, rather than de-
signing the structure of the Stackelberg game.
3 Optimizing Payoff with Budget Constraint
in Weighted L1-norm Form
In this section, we focus on computing the optimal way of
manipulating attacker’s payoffs and allocating defensive re-
sources when the defender can change the attacker’s reward
and penalty at a cost that grows linearly in the amount of
change and the defender has a limited budget for making the
changes. The cost rate, referred to as weights, may be differ-
ent across targets. This is an abstraction of several domains.
For example, a network administrator may change the actual
or appeared value of any network node although such change
often incurs time and hardware costs.
Let Ra, P a, R¯a, P¯ a denote the attacker’s reward and
penalty vectors before and after the manipulation. Similar to
the initial payoff structure, we require that R¯a ≥ 0 ≥ P¯ a and
denote Dj = Raj − P aj . Let  = R¯a −Ra and δ = P¯ a − P a
be the amount of change in attacker’s reward and penalty and
µ, θ the weights on , δ resp.. The budget constraint is in
weighted L1 norm form, i.e.,
∑
j(µj |j |+θj |δj |) ≤ B where
B is the budget. The defender’s strategy is characterized by
(c, , δ). Given this strategy, in the manipulated game the at-
tacker attacks some target t, which belongs to the attack set
Γ. We first show some properties of the optimal solution.
Theorem 1. There is an optimal solution (c, , δ) with corre-
sponding attack target t and attack set Γ which satisfies the
following conditions:
1. cj = 0, j = 0, δj = 0,∀j /∈ Γ.
2. t ≥ 0, δt ≥ 0; j ≤ 0, δj ≤ 0, ∀j 6= t.
3. δtt(δt + P at ) = 0 and δjj(R
a
j + j) = 0, ∀j 6= t.
Proof sketch. Condition 1: If any j , δj 6= 0 with j /∈ Γ,
we may either set j , δj = 0 or push j into the attack set.
There is no need to protect a target that is not in the attack set.
Condition 2: Flipping the sign of  and δ leads to no better
solution. Condition 3: For each target i, we can shift the
change on Rai to P
a
i and vice versa while one is more budget
efficient than the other depending on coverage. We can show
that these manipulations can be done simultaneously.2
Similar to the multiple LPs formulation in [Conitzer and
Sandholm, 2006], we consider n subproblems Pi, each as-
suming some target i ∈ T is the attack target, and the best
solution among all n subproblems is the optimal defender
strategy. Condition 2 in Property 1 shows it is possible to
infer the sign of  and δ given the attack target. So in the
sequel, we abuse the notation by treating , δ as the absolute
value of the amount of change, and assume w.l.o.g. that in Pi,
R¯ai = R
a
i +i, P¯
a
i = P
a
i +δi and ∀j 6= i, R¯aj = Raj−j , P¯ aj =
P aj − δj . Thus, a straightforward formulation for Pi is
max
c,,δ
Udi = R
d
i ci + P
d
i (1− ci) = ciDi + P di (2)
s.t. Uai = ci(P
a
i + δi) + (1− ci)(Rai + i) (3)
≥ Uaj = cj(P aj − δj) + (1− cj)(Raj − j),∀j 6= i∑
j
(µjj + θjδj) ≤ B (4)∑
j
cj ≤ r (5)
Raj − j ≥ 0, ∀j 6= i (6)
P ai + δi ≤ 0 (7)
cj , j , δj ≥ 0, cj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ T (8)
The above formulation is non-convex due to the quadratic
terms in Constraint 3 which leads to an indefinite Hessian
matrix (see Appendix B), and thus no existing solvers can
guarantee global optimality for the above formulation.
3.1 A MILP-based Solution with Approximation
Guarantee
To find a defender strategy with solution quality guarantee,
we solve the atomic version of the subproblems with MILPs.
We show an approximation guarantee which improves as
the fineness of discretization grows. We further propose a
branch-and-bound-like framework for pruning subproblems
to improve runtime efficiency.
In the atomic version of the payoff manipulation problem,
we assume the defender can only make atomic changes, with
the minimum amount of change given as ρ0. We refer to the
atomic version of Pi as APi. APi can be formulated as the
2Due to limited space, the full proofs are included in the full
version of the paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.01987
MILP in Equations 9-19. We simplify the objective function
as ci since Di ≥ 0. All constraints involving sub/super-script
j, k without a summation apply to all proper range of sum-
mation indices. We use binary representation for R¯ai /ρ0 and
P¯ ai /ρ0 in constraints 10-14. The binary representation results
in bilinear terms like ykj cj . We introduce variables α
k
j , β
k
j and
constraints 18-19 to linearize them.
max
ykj ,z
k
j ,cj
ci (9)
s.t. Constraint 4-8
i = ρ0
∑
k
2kyki −Rai (10)
j = R
a
j − ρ0
∑
k
2kykj , ∀j 6= i (11)
δi = −ρ0
∑
k
2kzki − P ai (12)
δj = P
a
j + ρ0
∑
k
2kzkj , ∀j 6= i (13)
ykj , z
k
j ∈ {0, 1} (14)
vi ≥ vj (15)
vi = R
a
i + i − ρ0
∑
k
2k(αki + β
k
i ) (16)
vj = R
a
j − j − ρ0
∑
k
2k(αkj + β
k
j ),∀j 6= i
(17)
0 ≤ αkj ≤ ykj , cj − (1− ykj ) ≤ αkj ≤ cj (18)
0 ≤ βkj ≤ zkj , cj − (1− zkj ) ≤ βkj ≤ cj (19)
The optimal defender strategy for the atomic payoff ma-
nipulation problem can be found by checking the solution to
all the subproblems and compare the corresponding Udi . We
can also combine all the subproblems by constructing a single
MILP, with additional variables indicating which subproblem
is optimal. The details can be found in the full version.
A natural idea to approximate the global optima of the orig-
inal L1-constrained payoff manipulation problem is, for each
attack target i, approximate Pi withAPi using small enough
ρ0. Theorem 2 below shows such an approximation bound.
Theorem 2. The solution of the atomic problem is an additive
maxi
2ρ0(R
d
i−Pdi )
Rai
-approximation to the original problem.
Proof sketch. The floor and ceiling notations are about the
“integral grid” defined by ρ0. Suppose (c∗, ∗, δ∗) is an op-
timal solution to Pi. Let ′ = b∗c, δ′ = bδ∗c, and c′ = c∗
except c′i = c
∗
i − 2ρ0/(Di + ′i − δ′i). We can show such fea-
sible solutions yield the desired approximation bound.
We note that the idea of discretizing the manipulation space
is similar to [Blocki et al., 2013; Blocki et al., 2015]. Yet al-
lowing changes in both reward and penalty and the difference
in objective function make our formulation different and the
reduction to SOCP used in [Blocki et al., 2015] inapplicable.
We can further improve the practical runtime of the MILPs
by pruning and prioritizing subproblems as shown in Alg. 1.
We first compute a global lower bound by checking a se-
quence of greedy manipulations. Inspired by Condition 2 and
3 in Property 1, we greedily spend all the budget on one tar-
get to increase its reward or penalty, leaving all other targets’
payoff parameters unchanged (Lines 2 - 8).
Algorithm 1 Branch-and-bound
Input: Payoffs σ = {Rd, Pd, Ra, Pa}, budgetB
1: Initialize LB ← ∅, globalLB ← −∞, N ← ∅ containing set of indices of
pruned subproblems. Set ρ0 to be a desired accuracy.
2: for Subproblem Pi do
3: Greedy Modifications (GM):
4: GM1 ← R¯ai = Rai + B
5: GM2 ← P¯ai = min{Pai + B, 0}, R¯ai = max{Rai , Rai + B + Pai }
6: LBi ← maxj∈{1,2} ORIGAMI-BS(GMj)
7: end for
8: globalLB ← maxi∈[n] LBi
9: Sort Pi in decreasing LBi.
10: for sorted Pi do
11: Overuse Modifications (OM): ∀j 6= i, R¯aj = max{0, Raj − B}, P¯aj =
min{Paj , Paj − B + Raj }
12: OM1 ← R¯ai = Rai + B.
13: OM2 ← P¯ai = min{Pai + B, 0}, R¯ai = max{Rai , Rai + B + Pai }
14: UBi ← minj∈{1,2} ORIGAMI-BS(OMj)
15: if UBi ≤ globalLB then
16: Prune Pi
17: else
18: run MILP of Pi with additional constraint ci ≤ globalLB−P
d
i
Rd
i
−Pd
i
19: end if
20: end for
21: Output: Best solution among globalLB and all Pi’s.
Upper bounds in Pi can be computed with budget reuse:
we independently spend the full amount of budget B on each
target to increase Rai and P
a
i and decrease R
a
j and P
a
j , j 6= i,
as much as possible. For the ease of notation, in Alg. 1 we
assume manipulations have uniform cost. The weighted case
can be easily extended.
The subproblem Pi is pruned if its upper bound is lower
than the global lower bound. To make the pruning more effi-
cient, we solve subproblems in descending order of their cor-
responding lower bounds, hoping for an increase in the global
lower bound. For subproblems that cannot be pruned, we set
ρ0 to the desired accuracy and solve the MILP to approximate
the subproblem optima. We also add to the MILP the linear
constraint on ci derived from the global lower bound.
To get the bounds, we call an improved version of the
ORIGAMI algorithm in [Kiekintveld et al., 2009] by doing
a binary search on the size of the attack set Γ, and solve
the linear system. It is denoted as ORIGAMI-BS in Alg. 1.
Recall r is the defender’s total resource. Let M be the at-
tacker’s expected utility for attack set and E¯k = 1R¯ai−P¯ai
.
From Uai = U
a
j ,∀j ∈ Γ and
∑
j∈Γ cj = r, we obtain
M =
∑
k∈Γ R¯
a
kE¯k − r∑
k∈Γ E¯k
(20)
cj = E¯j
(∑
k∈Γ(R¯
a
j − R¯ak)E¯k + r∑
k∈Γ E¯k
)
, ∀j ∈ Γ (21)
We iteratively cut the search space by half based on cj and
M . The complexity improves from O(n2) to O(n log n). A
complete description can be found in the full version.
We end this subsection by remarking that atomic payoff
manipulation arises in many real-world applications. For ex-
ample, it is infeasible for the wildlife ranger to charge the
poacher a fine of $100/3. In those cases, our proposed MILP
formulation could be directly applied.
Algorithm 2 PTAS for a special case in L1
Input: Payoffs {Rd, Pd, Ra, Pa}, budgetB, tolerance η.
1: InitializeM ← −∞
2: for all ordered pairs of targets (i, j) do
3: for s = 0, 1, . . . , bB/ηc do
4: M ← max{M,ORIGAMI-BS(Rd, Pd, Ra+sei−(B−s)ej , Rd)}
5: M ← max{M,ORIGAMI-BS(Rd, Pd, Ra+sei, Rd−(B−s)ej)}
6: M ← max{M,ORIGAMI-BS(Rd, Pd, Ra, Rd+sei−(B−s)ej)}
7: M ← max{M,ORIGAMI-BS(Rd, Pd, Ra−(B−s)ej , Rd+sei)}
8: end for
9: end for
10: Output: M
3.2 PTAS for Limited Budget and Uniform Costs
We show that for a special but practical class of problems,
there exist a PTAS. In many applications, the defender has
only a limited budget B ≤ minj∈T {
∣∣P aj ∣∣ , Raj }. Addition-
ally, the weights on  and δ are the same. W.l.o.g., we assume
µj = θj = 1. We first show a structural theorem below and
then discuss its algorithmic implication.
Theorem 3. When budget B ≤ minj∈T {
∣∣P aj ∣∣ , Raj } and
µj = θj = 1,∀j ∈ T , there exists an optimal solution which
manipulates the attack target and at most one other target.
Proof sketch. Since B is limited, either Rat or P
a
t is un-
changed according to Condition 3 of Property 1. Assume all
manipulations happen on attacker’s reward. If some three tar-
gets get manipulated, we can simultaneously increase t for
attack target t and decrease j for j 6= t such that j’s util-
ity increases to be the same as target t, until some j becomes
0. After such change, the defender’s utility does not decrease,
and the number of targets manipulated decreases. Other cases
also hold due to symmetry.
The theorem above is tight, i.e. we show in the full ver-
sion an instance where two targets are manipulated. When
B ≤ minj∈T {
∣∣P aj ∣∣ , Raj } and µj = θj = 1,∀j ∈ T , Theo-
rem 3 naturally suggests a PTAS – we can use linear search
for manipulations on all pairs of targets as shown in Alg. 2,
where ei is a unit vector with a single one at position i. Theo-
rem 4 shows the approximation guarantee, with a proof simi-
lar to Theorem 2, which is included in the full version.
Theorem 4. Alg. 2 returns an additive maxi∈[n]
2η(Rdi−Pdi )
Rai
approximate solution.
4 Optimizing Payoff with Budget Constraint
in Other Forms
In this section, we explore budget constraints in other forms
and show polynomial time algorithms correspondingly.
4.1 Weighted L∞-norm Form
Consider the case where the defender can make changes to
Ra and P a for every target up to the extent specified by
Bri and B
p
i respectively. Following previous notations, this
requirement can be represented by a budget constraint in
weighted L∞-norm form, i.e., maxj{|j |/Bri , |δj |/Bpi } ≤ 1.
Equivalently, the defender can choose Ra and P a from a
given range. A real-world setting for this problem is when
a higher level of authority specifies a range of penalty for
activities incurring pollution and allow the local agencies to
determine the concrete level of penalty for different activities.
We observe that Condition 2 of Property 1 still holds in
this setting. Therefore, such problem can be solved by simply
solving n subproblems. In the ith subproblem which assumes
i is the attack target, we may set reward and penalty of i to
be the upper bound in the given range and choose the lower
bound for other targets. With our improved ORIGAMI-BS
algorithm, this problem can be solved in O(n2 log n) time.
Theorem 5. With budget constraint in weighted L∞-norm,
solving for defender’s optimal strategy reduces to solving for
defender’s optimal coverage in fixed-payoff security games.
4.2 L0-norm Form
In some domains, the defender can make some of the tar-
gets special. For example, in wildlife protection, legislators
can designate some areas as "core zones", where no human
activity is allowed and much more severe punishment can
be carried out. But the defender cannot set all the areas to
be core zones. We model such restrictions as setting a limit
on the Hamming distance between the original penalty vec-
tor and the manipulated penalty vector for the attacker, i.e.,∑
j 1(|δj | > 0) ≤ B where B is the budget. Following
[Donoho and Elad, 2003], we refer to it as a L0-norm form
budget constraint for simplicity even though it is not techni-
cally a norm. That is, the defender needs to pay a unit cost
to manipulate P ai on target i but the magnitude of change can
be arbitrary. The defender needs to choose which targets to
make changes. We do not consider the case where the de-
fender can arbitrarily modify the attacker’s reward Ra as it is
not practical and will lead to a trivial solution: the defender
will place all coverage on one attack target t = arg maxiRdi
and set Rat =∞.
We assume the defender has a budget which allows her to
change the penalty of B targets. Similar to the L∞ case, we
first observe that the defender will choose an extreme penalty
value once he decides to change the penalty of a target.
Property 1. There exists an optimal solution where either
P¯ aj = −∞ for B targets or P¯ aj = −∞ for (B − 1) targets
and P¯ at = 0 for 1 target. If P¯
a
j = −∞, then cj = 0.
Proof. When t is the attack target, the defender would like to
maximize P¯ at and minimize P¯
a
j for all j 6= t. If P¯ aj = −∞
and cj > 0, target j will not be attacked as Uaj = −∞. In
such case, target j is effectively removed from the game.
The defender’s problem becomes non-trivial when the bud-
get B < T , and we now provide a O(n3) algorithm (Alg. 3)
for solving this problem. We note that several intuitive greedy
algorithms do not work, even in more restrictive game set-
tings. A detailed comparison of our algorithm, several greedy
algorithms, and a baseline MILP is provided in Section 5.
First, we sort the targets in decreasing attacker’s reward
Rak. LetEk =
1
Rak−Pak and E¯k =
1
R¯ak−P¯ak
for all k ∈ T . When
i is the attack target, by Property 1, we have E¯i ∈ {1/Rai , Ei}
and E¯j ∈ {0, Ej}. Let Γl = {1, 2, . . . , l} for l = 1, 2, . . . , n.
We notice that one of the Γl’s, denoted as Γl∗ , encapsulates
the attack set in the optimal solution to our problem. That is,
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for budget in L0-norm form
Input: Payoffs {Rd, Pd, Ra, Pa}, budgetB
1: Initialize Ud(1..n, 1..n)← −∞.
2: for attack set Γl do
3: for attack target i ∈ Γl do
4: {V alue,Γdropl ,Γkeepl } ← Random(〈v, w〉, s)
5: Set E¯j ← 0 for j ∈ Γdropl , E¯j ← Ej for j ∈ Γkeepl .
6: If solution is valid, i.e. M ≥ Ral+1 and cj ∈ [0, 1], then update Ud(l, i)
7: Repeat inner iteration with s← min{B − 1, l− 2} and E¯i ← 1/Rai .
8: end for
9: end for
10: for target k with largest s Pak do
11: for attack target i do
12: Update Ud(l, i) if r big enough for ck = 1
13: end for
14: end for
15: Output: max(Ud)
in the optimal solution, each target in the attack set is in Γl∗ ;
those targets not in the attack set either are outside Γl∗ , or, if
they are in Γl∗ , have P¯ a = −∞. A proof can be found in the
full version. This allows us to formally define a subproblem
Ql,i: assume (i) the optimal attack set is encapsulated by Γl,
(ii) the attack target is i ∈ Γl, and (iii) no target is covered
with certainty, what is the defender’s optimal strategy (c, E¯)?
A subproblem may be infeasible. First, we show thatQl,i can
be solved in O(n) time. From Equation 21, for subproblem
Ql,i, we have
ci
E¯i
=
∑
k∈Γl\{i}(R
a
i −Rak)E¯k + r
E¯i +
∑
k∈Γl\{i} E¯k
(22)
Let s = min{B, l − 2} if E¯i = Ei and s = min{B −
1, l − 2} if E¯i = 1Ri . Then Ql,i reduces to finding s out of
the (l − 1) E¯k’s to set to 0, and set the rest E¯k = Ek, so as
to maximize the above quotient. As a result, Ql,i is closely
connected to the problem of choosing subsets with maximum
weighted average, which can be solved efficiently.
Proposition 1. [Eppstein and Hirschberg, 1997] Given a
set S where |S| = n, real numbers {vk : k ∈ S}, positive
weights {wk : k ∈ S}, and an integer r. Among all subsets
of S of order n−r, a subset T ⊂ S which maximizesA(T ) =∑
k∈T vk∑
k∈T wk
can be found in O(n) time.
Lemma 1. The subproblem Ql,i can be solved in O(n) time.
Proof. Consider Equation 22. We equate vk = (Ri −
Rk)Ek +
m
l−s−1 and wk = Ek +
1
l−s−1 E¯i. Let v = {vk :
k ∈ Γl\{i}}, w = {wk : k ∈ Γl\{i}}. By Property 1,
we may assume s targets will be removed. Finding a subset
T ⊂ Γl\{i}, |T | = l−s−1, to maximizeA(T ) is equivalent
to our problem to maximize the quotient in Equation 22.
After we find the optimal choices for the s targets, we need
to verify on Line 6 of Alg. 3 that the attack set is valid. Since
ck = 0 for k /∈ Γl, we need M ≥ Ral+1, where M is the
attacker’s expected utility as defined in Equation 20. We also
need valid coverage probabilities cj’s. These could have been
violated by setting some P¯i’s to −∞.
We are now ready to show the main result of this section.
Theorem 6. There is a O(n3) algorithm for finding the opti-
mal defender strategy with budget constraint in L0-norm.
Proof sketch. Consider Alg. 3. Since Ra is fixed, Γl’s cover
all the attack sets that need to be checked. There are O(n2)
subproblems Ql,i. For each Ql,i, we run a randomized algo-
rithm for the maximum weighted average problem with ex-
pected running time O(n) (Line 4). A deterministic O(n)
algorithm exists in [Eppstein and Hirschberg, 1997]. The
subproblems Ql,i miss the solutions where some target j is
covered with certainty. In this case, Γn is the only possible
attack set, and the solution is found on Lines 10-14. A solu-
tion is feasible if by removing targets we can keep the sum of
coverage probabilities below the defender’s resources.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Simulation Results for L1 Budget Problem
We compare our branch-and-bound (BnB) algorithm (Alg. 1)
with three baseline algorithms – NonConv, multiple MILP,
and single MILP. NonConv refers to solving n non-convex
optimization problems as shown in Equations 2-8 using
IPOPT [Wächter and Biegler, 2006] solver with default pa-
rameter setting, which converges to local optima with no
global optimality guarantee. Multiple MILPs, as specified
by Equations 9-19, and the single MILP formulation, in the
full version, are equivalent and have an approximation guar-
antee specified in Thm. 2. The original payoff structures are
randomly generated integers between 1 and 2n with penalties
obtained by negation (recall n is the number of targets). Bud-
get and weights of the manipulations are randomly generated
integers between 1 and 4n.
We set ρ0 = mini∈T
Rai
4(Rdi−Pdi )
which gives an additive
1
2 -approximate solution. Gurobi is used for solving MILPs,
which is terminated when either time limit (15 min) or op-
timality gap (1%) is achieved. For each problem size, we
run 60 experiments on a PC with Intel Core i7 processor.
The solution quality of a particular algorithm is measured
by the multiplicative gap between that algorithm and BnB,
i.e. ZA−ZBnBZBnB where ZA is best solution value by algorithm A.
Thus a positive (negative) gap indicates better (worse) solu-
tion value than BnB. We report mean and standard deviation
of the mean of runtime and solution quality in Fig. 1. Small
instances refer to problem sizes from 5 to 25. Large instances
refer to problem sizes from 50 to 250.
For problems of small size (Fig. 1a and 1b), BnB finds
better solutions in nearly the same time as NonConv, faster
than the other two. Since budget size can easily be indivis-
ible by ρ0 which is the atomic change we can make, greedy
manipulation cannot be achieved by MILPs when such indi-
visibility happens. On the other hand, BnB first computes
a global lower bound using such greedy manipulations, thus
creating a gap between BnB and the other two MILP-based
algorithms. Indeed the multiplicative gap between the greedy
solution and the optimal solution is reported as 0.39% with
a variance of 0.14%. For problems of large size (Fig. 1c and
1d), we only compare BnB and NonConv as the other two
algorithms timed out in solving MILP. BnB runs faster than
NonConv. It returns better solutions for three problem sizes
and nearly the same solution for the other two cases. The
MILP-based solution including BnB also has a larger stan-
dard deviation in runtime than NonConv.
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Figure 1: Runtime and solution quality for L1 case with standard
deviation of the mean shown as vertical line
5.2 Simulation Results for L0 Budget Problem
We compare the performance of our O(n3) algorithm with
a baseline MILP and two greedy algorithms. Greedy1 re-
moves a target that can lead to most solution quality increase
at a time. Greedy2 starts from the target with highest |P d|
and determines whether to remove it by checking the solution
quality before and after removal. Details of these algorithms
can be found in the full version.
Initial payoffs are generated in the same way as in the pre-
vious subsection. In Fig. 2a, we assume the defender has
r = 1 resource and budget B = n/2, the worst case for the
O(n3) algorithm. The runtime of MILP starts to explode with
more than 100 targets, while the O(n3) algorithm solves the
problem rather efficiently. We also note that MILP exhibits
high variance in runtime. The variances of other algorithms,
including the O(n3) algorithm, are relatively trivial and thus
not plotted. We then test the algorithms with multiple de-
fender resources, as shown in Fig. 2b. With n targets, we
assume the defender has r = n/10 units of resources and a
budget B = n/2. Most MILP instances reach the time limit
of 5 minutes when n ≥ 100. Yet the O(n3) algorithm’s run-
time is almost the same as the single resource case.
Our O(n3) algorithm and MILP are guaranteed to pro-
vide the optimal solution. In contrast, the greedy algo-
rithms exhibit fast runtime but provide no solution guaran-
tee. We measure the solution quality in Fig. 2c and 2d using
Udgreedy−p
Udopt−p where p = minj P
d
j . Greedy1, which runs slightly
slower than Greedy2, achieves higher solution quality but
both greedy algorithms can lead to a significant loss. In fact,
extreme examples exist, as shown in the full version.
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A Omitted Algorithms
A.1 ORIGAMI with Binary Search
Algorithm 4 ORIGAMI-BS
Input: Payoffs σ = {Rd, Pd, Ra, Pa}
1: Initialize start = 0, end = n, c = 0, lastTarget = n− 1.
2: while end− start > 1 do
3: Letmid = b end+start2 c, attack set Γ← {1, . . . ,mid}.
4: CalculateM and c using Equations 20 - 21
5: if c(k) < 0 for some k ∈ Γ then
6: end← mid
7: else ifM < Ramid+1 then
8: start← mid
9: else
10: lastTarget← max{k ≥ mid : Rak = M}
11: break
12: end if
13: end while
14: Let Γ = {1, . . . , lastTarget}. LetA = {k ∈ Γ : ck >= 1}.
15: ifA 6= ∅ then
16: covBound = max
k∈A
Rak . For all k ∈ Γ, set ck ← Ri−covBoundRi−Pi
17: end if
18: for k /∈ Γ do
19: ck ← 0
20: end for
21: for k ∈ [n] do
22: defEU(k)← c(k).
23: end for
24: Output: max
k∈Γ
defEU(k)
A.2 A single MILP for L1 Budget Problem
min d (23)
s.t. j = ρ0
∑
k
2kykj −Raj (24)
δj = −ρ0
∑
k
2kzkj − P aj (25)
− +j ≤ j ≤ +j (26)
− δ+j ≤ δj ≤ δ+j (27)∑n
j=1
(µj
+
j + σjδ
+
j ) ≤ B (28)
Raj + j ≥ 0 (29)
P aj + δj ≤ 0 (30)
0 ≤ αkj ≤ ykj , cj − (1− ykj ) ≤ αkj ≤ cj (31)
0 ≤ βkj ≤ zkj , cj − (1− zkj ) ≤ βkj ≤ cj (32)
vj = ρ0
∑
k
2k(ykj − αkj − βkj ) (33)
vj ≤ U (34)
vj ≥ U − (1− γj)Z (35)
d ≤ Rdj cj + P dj (1− cj) + (1− γj)Z (36)∑
j
γj = 1 (37)
ykj , z
k
j , γj ∈ {0, 1} (38)∑
j
cj ≤ 1, cj ≥ 0 (39)
All constraints involving sub/super-script j, k without a sum-
mation apply to all proper range of summation indices.
We first introduce non-negative integer variables +j , δ
+
j
and constraints +j ≥ j , +j ≥ −j , δ+j ≥ δj , δ+j ≥ −δj to
replace the absolute value change. We use binary represen-
tation for R¯a and P¯ a in constraints 24-25. Specifically, we
have R¯aj =
∑
k 2
kykj , P
a
j = −
∑
k 2
kzkj where y
k
j , z
k
j are 0-
1 variables. Recall from Prop. 1 we can assume without loss
of generality that t, δt ≥ 0 and ∀j 6= t, j , δj ≤ 0.
After the above reformulation, notice that we have bilin-
ear term like ykj cj involved in the formulation. We introduce
real-valued variables αkj , β
k
j and constraints 31-32 to enforce
αkj = y
k
j cj and β
k
j = z
k
j cj . We then introduce binary vari-
ables γt to indicate whether target t is in the attack set (the set
of targets with highest attacker utility) and constraint 34-35
to enforce that the attack target has the highest attacker’s ex-
pected utility. Constraint 36 enforces d to be upper bounded
by the defender’s expected utility of the attack target. There-
fore maximizing d gives the defender’s expected utility of the
attack target.
A.3 Baseline Algorithms for L0 Budget Problem
max d (40)
s.t. d− UΘ(t, C) ≤ (1− at)Z, ∀t (41)
− wtZ ≤ k − UΨ(t, C) ≤ (1− at)Z, ∀t
(42)
UΘ(t, C) = ctR
d
t + (1− ct)P dt , ∀t (43)
UΨ(t, C) ≥ (1− ct)Rat + ctP at − btZ, ∀t
(44)
UΨ(t, C) ≤ (1− ct)Rat + ctP at + btZ, ∀t
(45)
UΨ(t, C) ≥ (1− ct)Rat + (1− bt)P at , ∀t
(46)
UΨ(t, C) ≤ (1− ct)Rat + (bt − 1)P at , ∀t
(47)
ct ∈ [0, 1],
∑
t
ct ≤ 1 (48)
bt ≤ at, ∀t (49)
wt + at ≤ 1, ∀t (50)∑
t
wt +
∑
t
bt ≤ B (51)∑
t
at = 1 (52)
at, wt, bt ∈ {0, 1} (53)
In this MILP, at indicates whether target t is attacked; bt in-
dicates whether the attacker’s penalty on target t is set to 0;
wt indicates whether target t is removed (attacker’s penalty
on target t is set to −∞); ct is the coverage probability.
Equations 44-47 ensure that for non-attack targets and
for attack targets whose attacker’s penalty is not set to 0,
UΨ(t, C) = (1 − ct)Rat + ctP at ; for the attack target whose
attacker’s penalty is set to 0, UΨ(t, C) = (1 − ct)Rat . This
formulation assumes P at ≤ 0. Equation 50 says the defender
can only remove a non-attack target.
The baseline L0-Greedy1 is not an exact algorithm, which
can give arbitrarily large error with the following example.
Algorithm 5 L0-Greedy1
Input: Payoffs {Rd, Pd, Ra, Pa}, budgetB
1: Initialize defEURemove(1..n) = defEUZero(1..n) = −∞.
2: for greedy step i = 1 to B do
3: for each remaining target t with Pat 6= 0 do
4: defEURemove(t) = ORIGAMI(Payoffs with target t removed)
5: end for
6: if Pat 6= 0 for all targets t then
7: for each remaining target t do
8: defEUZero(t) = ORIGAMI(Payoffs with Pat = 0)
9: end for
10: end if
11: if max(defEURemove)≥ max(defEUZero) then
12: Remove the target with max(defEURemove)
13: else
14: Set Pat = 0 for the target t with max(defEUZero)
15: end if
16: end for
17: Output: max(max(defEURemove), max(defEUZero))
Suppose we have 3 targets, budget is 2. Consider the fol-
lowing payoff matrix on the left. The optimal solution is to
eliminate targets 1 and 2, extracting allRd3 = 10 as defender’s
utility. Yet L0-Greedy1 sets P d2 = 0 in the first iteration. In
the second iteration, it is indifferent about removing targets 1
or 3, both giving a final defender’s utility of 0.476. We can
scale up all values with absolute value 10 to arbitrarily large,
and the resulting defender’s utility is still very small.
t1 t2 t3
Rd 1 1 10
P d -1 -10 -10
Ra 1 10 1
P a -10 -10 -10
t1 t2 t3
Rd 10 1 1
P d -1.1 -1 -0.9
Ra 1 1 1
P a -1 -1 -1
The L0-Greedy2, as shown in Alg. 6, is also not exact.
Consider the above payoff matrix on the right. The op-
timal solution is to eliminate targets t2 and t3, extracting
Ud = Rd1 = 10. However, since ORIGAMI yields a uni-
form coverage, target t1 is removed at the first iteration, thus
the defender can achieve utility of 1 at maximum.
Algorithm 6 L0-Greedy2
Input: Payoffs {Rd, Pd, Ra, Pa}, budgetB
1: while Budget allows do
2: Solve the game with ORIGAMI
3: If j is in the attack set, remove it, j ← j + 1.
4: end while
5: Output: max(max(defEURemove), max(defEUZero))
B Full Proofs Omitted in Text
Theorem 1. There is an optimal solution (c, , δ) with corre-
sponding attack target t and attack set Γ which satisfies the
following conditions:
1. cj = 0, j = 0, δj = 0,∀j /∈ Γ.
2. t ≥ 0, δt ≥ 0; j ≤ 0, δj ≤ 0, ∀j 6= t.
3. δtt(δt + P at ) = 0 and δjj(R
a
j + j) = 0, ∀j 6= t.
Proof. Condition 1 In an optimal solution (c, , δ), by the
principle of ORIGAMI, we know that cj = 0,∀j /∈ τ(c, , δ).
We build an optimal solution (c, 1, δ1) and show that it sat-
isfies Condition 1. If j > 0 or δj 6= 0, we can safely let
1j = 0 and δ
1
j = 0 and target j is still outside τ(c, , δ). If
j < 0, we can increase j to 1j , such that j gets included in
the attack set with cj = 0. Hence, the solution (c, 1, δ1) is
optimal and satisfies Condition 1. From now on, we assume
such an optimal solution (c, 1, δ1) exists.
Condition 2 We only prove t ≥ 0, others follow similarly.
Suppose an optimal solution (c, 1, δ1) satisfying Condition
1 is such that 1t < 0. Let δ
2 = δ1,∀j 6= t, 2j = 1j and
2t = −1t . Note that (c, 2, δ2) is a feasible solution with the
same objective ci and hence optimal. Let c2 be the coverage
determined by ORIGAMI with payoff structure (2, δ2), then
once again (c2, 2, δ2) is optimal. We apply the same reason-
ing as the previous paragraph, and get that some (c2, 3, δ3) is
an optimal solution satisfying condition 1 and 3t ≥ 0, 3j ≤ 0
for j 6= t.
Condition 3 We only prove the second part; the first part fol-
lows similarly. Now we have an optimal solution (c2, 3, δ3)
satisfying Conditions 1 and 2. Note that when some c2j ≤
1/2, having 3j > 0 and δ
3
j = 0 yields the same U
a
j as having
4j = 0 and δ
4
j = 
3
j (1−c2j )/c2j . However, the former choice is
more budget efficient. This holds unless the required change
is excessive such that Raj − 3j = 0 and δ3j < 0. Therefore,
an optimal solution (c2, 3, δ3) satisfying Conditions 1 and
2 can be easily modified to an optimal solution (c2, 4, δ4)
which also satisfies Condition 3.
Proof of the non-convexity of Subproblem Pi. Consider the
constraints involving quadratic terms, we can rewrite the
constraint in terms of variable X = (c, , δ, 1) where the
last constant 1 is used to generate linear terms. Using X ,
each quadratic constraint can be written in the form of
XTQX ≤ 0 where all diagonals of Q except the last one is
zero. It is not hard to see that Q is indefinite.
Theorem 2. The solution of the atomic problem is an additive
maxi
2ρ0(R
d
i−Pdi )
Rai
-approximation to the original problem.
Proof. The floor and ceiling notations in the sequel are about
the “integral grid” defined by ρ0. Let (c∗, ∗, δ∗) be an opti-
mal solution to the subproblem Pi. We construct a feasible
solution (c′, ′, δ′) with c′i close to c
∗
i . Let U
a∗
i and U
a′
i be
the attacker’s expected utilities.
Let ′ = b∗c, δ′ = bδ∗c, and c′ = c∗ except c′i = c∗i −
2ρ0
Di+′i−δ′i . For the attack target i, we have
Ua∗i − Ua
′
i
= (∗i − ′i)−Di(c∗i − c′i)− (c∗i ∗i − c′i′i) + (c∗i δ∗i − c′iδ′i)
= (1− c∗i )(∗i − ′i) + c∗i (δ∗i − δ′i)− 2ρ0
≤ −ρ0
(54)
For non-attack targets j, we have
Ua∗j − Ua
′
j
= (′j − ∗j )−Di(c∗j − c′j) + (c∗j ∗j − c′j′j)− (c∗jδ∗j − c′jδ′j)
= (1− c∗j )(′j − ∗j )− c∗j (δ∗j − δ′j)
≥ −ρ0
(55)
Therefore, the solution (c′, ′, δ′) is feasible, and we have
c′i ≥ c∗i − 2ρ0Rai . By solving all atomic subproblems, we have
an additive maxi(Rdi −P di ) 2ρ0Rai -approximation to the original
problem.
Theorem 3. When budget B ≤ minj∈T {
∣∣P aj ∣∣ , Raj } and
µj = θj = 1,∀j ∈ T , there exists an optimal solution which
manipulates the attack target and at most one other target.
Proof. Since the budget is limited, for each target exactly one
of its reward and penalty can be manipulated, i.e. ∀i ∈ T ex-
actly one of i and δi is non-zero. Let Γ be the set of targets
whose reward or penalty is manipulated, let t be the attack
target. Below we only consider the case where reward has
been manipulated. Others follow similarly due to symmetry.
Let i∗ = arg mini∈Γ\{t} i(1 − ci). For each i ∈ Γ\{t}, de-
crease i by
(1−ci)i∗
1−ci∗ . Note by the definition of i
∗ we have
i ≥ (1−ci)i∗1−ci∗ , i.e. we won’t make some reward negative
when decreasing decreasing  as above. Now we increase
the reward of attack target t by (1−ct)i∗1−ci∗ . It is not hard to
see after those manipulations, those targets that were in the
attack set before are still in the attack set and that the ob-
jective value does not decrease. Below we show that it is
feasible to increase the reward of attack target by (1−ct)i∗1−ci∗ .
To do so we only need to show
∑
i∈Γ\{t} ≥ 1 − ct. Note
by decreasing the manipulation on other targets, we obtain∑
i∈Γ\{t}
i∗ (1−ci)
1−ci∗ available budgets. Since we assume only
reward is manipulated, it must be that ci ≤ 12 ,∀i ∈ T . As a
result
∑
i∈Γ\{t}(1− ci) ≥
∑
i∈Γ\{t} ci ≥ 1− ct.
Theorem 4. Alg. 2 returns an additive maxi∈[n]
2η(Rdi−Pdi )
Rai
approximate solution.
Proof. Suppose the optimal solution has i as the attack target
and j is the only other target in the attack set that has been
manipulated. Let the optimal solution be c∗, ∗, δ∗. w.l.o.g.
assume rewards are manipulated, i.e. ∗i > 0, 
∗
j < 0. Other
cases follow similarly. Let q be an integer such that qη ≤
∗i < (q + 1)η. Below we show the solution c where ci =
c∗i − ηDi and ∀k 6= i, ck = c∗k is a feasible solution when
i = qη, j = qη −B. The theorem then follows.
When i = qη, j = qη − B with coverage probability
exactly c∗, attEU(i) decreases by (1 − c∗i )(∗i − i) ≤ η
by our choice of q. To compensate this decrease to obtain
a feasible solution, we decrease c∗i by
η
Di
, which increases
attEU(i) by ηDi (Di + i) > η. Also note that decreasing R
a
j
by j maintains feasibility.
Theorem 5. With budget constraint in weighted L∞-norm,
solving for defender’s optimal strategy reduces to solving for
defender’s optimal coverage in fixed-payoff security games.
Proof. With target i being attacked, we have Uai ≥ Uaj for all
j ∈ T . The defender maximizes ci.
ci = maxc,P¯a,R¯a minj∈T−{i}
R¯ai − R¯aj + (R¯aj − P¯ aj )cj
R¯ai − P¯ ai
(56)
Let (c, Pˆ a, Rˆa) be an optimal solution. Let P¯ a be such that
P¯ ai = min(0, P
a
i − Bpi ) and P¯ aj = P ai + Bpi . Let R¯a be
such that R¯ai = R
a
i + B
r
i and R¯
a
j = max(0, R
a
i ). Note that
(c, R¯a, P¯ a) is also an optimal solution. It is obvious that min-
imizing |P ai |, maximizing |P aj |, and minimizing Raj should
make the inequality still hold. To see that the defender should
maximize R¯ai , we can rewrite the RHS of Equation 56 as
ci ≤ 1 +
P¯ ai − R¯aj (1− cj)− cjP¯ aj
R¯ai − P¯ ai
, ∀j ∈ T (57)
If the numerator is nonnegative, the value of Rai does not
matter because ci as probability takes a maximal value of 1.
Otherwise, we see that maximizing R¯ai maximizes the RHS.
Therefore, the defender may always use R¯a and P¯ a for the at-
tacker’s reward and penalty and solve the linear program for
coverage probability c, as in fixed-payoff security games.
Theorem 6. There is a O(n3) algorithm for finding the opti-
mal defender strategy with budget constraint in L0-norm.
Proof. By the ORIGAMI algorithm, we need only check the
attack sets Γl = {1, 2, 3, . . . , l} for l = 1, 2, . . . , n. Since
Ra is fixed, the attack sets that need to be checked in the op-
timal payoff structure (i.e. after manipulation) are contained
in the attack sets Γl’s that we will check in the initial payoff
structure. For example, suppose that in the final optimal solu-
tion, the defender removes targets 1,3,4, and the attack set is
{2, 5, 6} with target 7 left outside the attack set. Then, when
we check the attack set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} in the initial payoff
structure, we will find this solution.
When solving subproblemQl,i, if the choice violatesM ≥
Ral+1 or cj ≥ 0, we drop it on Line 6 of Algorithm 3. By
ORIGAMI, the general optimal choice E¯∗, which is discov-
ered as an optimal choice for Equation 22, will also satisfy
these conditions.
The subproblems Ql,i miss out solutions when some target
k is covered with certainty. ORIGAMI shows that in this case,
P ak ≥ P aj for all j ∈ Γl. Furthermore, since Raj ≥ 0 ≥
P aj , the only possible attack set is Γn = T . Once such a
target k is fixed, the coverage ci on the attack target i, the
objective value, is also fixed. We need only check whether
the defender has enough resources to maintain the attack set
after removing the most costly targets.
C An instance where greedy modification for
L1 case is sub-optimal
Our goal is to find instances for the greedy manipulation to
fail. We assume only reward is manipulated in the counterex-
ample. Since defender’s payoff can be arbitrarily set, we as-
sume t is the optimal attack target. By Thm. 3 there is at most
one more target manipulated in the optimal solution. We as-
sume j is that target. First note 1− ct < 1− cj as otherwise
we won’t push to j. We show the idea of shifting manipula-
tion from t to j so that the solution value increases. Use k
to denote other targets in the attack set. For simplicity let’s
consider the case that in the greedy manipulation, all targets
appear in the attack set, which is easy to construct. Denote
ct, t to be solutions to the greedy manipulation. Let ∆i be
the amount of i to push to j.
We can visualize the shifting process as follows: at the
start we have greedy manipulation solution, where each target
has a bin of the same height as their expected utility. Then
we shift ∆t to j which lowers the bin t and j. Because
1−ct < 1−cj , bin j is lower than bin t. Then we decrease cj
to lift bin j and increase ck to lower bin k. Let ∆cj , ∆ck be
the absolute change. If ∆cj >
∑
k∈Γ\{t,j}∆ck, we have ad-
ditional unused coverage which can be redistributed to lower
all bins, which as a result increases ct. Now quantify this pro-
cess and see how to make the numbers work out. Below I will
write ∆EU as absolute change in attacker’s expected utility.
First note ∆EU(t) = ∆t(1 − ct) and similarly for tar-
get j. To push bin k down to bin t, the least increase in ck
satisfies ∆ckDk = ∆EU(t) ⇒ ∆ck = ∆t(1−ct)Dk . On the
other hand we want to lift up bin j, the least decrease in cj
satisfies ∆j(Dj −∆t) = ∆EU(j) −∆EU(t) ⇒ ∆cj =
(ct−cj)∆t
Dt−∆t . We require
∆cj ≤ cj ⇒ ∆t ≤ cjDj
ct
(58)
Finally the constraint
∑
k∈Γ\{t,j}∆ck < ∆cj is now
equivalent to:∑
k∈Γ\{t,j}
∆t(1− ct)
Dk
<
∆t(ct − cj)
Dj −∆t (59)
⇒
∑
k∈Γ\{t,j}
(1− ct)
Dk
<
ct − cj
Dj −∆t (60)
A sufficient condition to guarantee this is∑
k∈Γ\{t,j}
(1− ct)
Dk
≤ ct − cj
Dj
⇒
∑
k∈Γ\{t,j}Dk ≥
1− ct
ct − cjDj
(61)
As a summary, as long as condition 58 and 61 is satisfied,
we have a counterexample (when all manipulations are on
reward of course). A concrete example is given below. As-
sume optimal attack target is 1. Ra1 = R
a
2 = 2, P
a
1 = P
a
2 =−2.∀k = 3, . . . , 9, Rak = 1.5, P ak = −8.5. Budget B = 1.
It is easy to see EU(k) = 1 for the greedy manipulation to
use budget to increase Ra1 (increasing P
a
1 gives a worse so-
lution). And c1 = 25 , c2 =
1
4 , ck =
1
20 . One can verify both
conditions can be satisfied.
